"Conditional contracts and sustainability:targeting lessons from an open access fishery", , March 2016.[Full text],
AbstractWe design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community.
Keywordsartifactual field experiment
stochastic production function
JEL codesC92: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Q22: Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture