Conditional contracts and sustainability:targeting lessons from an open access fishery

Article in a working paper series

Astrid Hopfensitz, Cesar Mantilla and Josepa Miquel-Florensa, "Conditional contracts and sustainability:targeting lessons from an open access fishery", IAST working paper, n. 16-35, March 2016.[Full text]


We design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community.


artifactual field experiment
dynamic resource
artisanal fishery
stochastic production function

JEL codes

C92: Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Q22: Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture

IAST Disciplines

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