Abstract

The efficiency of the common law hypothesis has generated a large bulk of literature in the last decades. The main argument is that there is an implicit economic logic to the common law; the doctrines in common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives which induce efficient behaviour. At the same time, the efficiency of the common law has been used to provide the microeconomic foundations for the legal origins literature. This new literature suggests that the common law is superior to French civil law in promoting economic growth. In this book we provide a methodological critique of this approach. We start by discussing the meaning of “common law” in this context and address the evolution of the common law from an efficiency paradigm. The second part of the book debunks the relationship between the efficiency of the common law hypothesis and the legal origins literature. We argue that there is no consistent theory based on the efficiency of the common law to explain the alleged inferiority of French civil law. Several examples, in private law and in legal institutions, are discussed in detail. Finally, we use the puzzle of mixed jurisdictions to further illustrate the conceptual limitations of the efficiency of the common law hypothesis and the legal origins literature.

Reference

Nuno Garoupa (University of Illinois), “Legal Origins and the Efficiency of the Common Law”, IAST General Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, January 9, 2014, 15:30–16:30, room MF323.