Abstract
Traditional banking is built on four pillars: SME lending, insured deposit taking, access to lender of last resort, and prudential supervision. This paper unveils the logic of the quadrilogy by showing that it emerges naturally as an equilibrium outcome in a game between banks and the government. A key insight is that regulation and public insurance services (LOLR, deposit insurance) are complementary. The model also shows how prudential regulation must adjust to the emergence of shadow banking, and rationalizes structural remedies to counter bogus liquidity hoarding and financial contagion: ring-fencing between regulated and shadow banking and the sharing of liquidity in centralized platforms.
Keywords
Retail and shadow banks; lender of last resort; deposit insurance; supervision; migration; ring-fencing; CCPs; narrow banks;
JEL codes
- E44: Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E58: Central Banks and Their Policies
- G21: Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages
- G28: Government Policy and Regulation
See also
Published in
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 88, n. 6, November 2021, p. 2622–2653