Abstract

Candidates in the developing world often run campaign platforms that promise crime reduction, but what do these law and order candidates achieve after taking office? I argue that even if their initiatives curb criminal activity, these policies may ultimately cause a surge in homicides. Implementing an electoral regression discontinuity design in Brazil that compares municipalities with a winning law and order council candidate versus others where that type of candidate ran but ultimately lost, this paper shows that where they win, spending in public security rises. This extra spending indicates actions against crime, which turn out to be modestly effective. At the same time, however, homicides of poor, non–white men surge. These results point that electorally motivated actions against crime can have dire consequences for politically marginalized groups that are vulnerable to violence.

Reference

Lucas Novaes, “The Violence of Law and Order Politics: The Case of Law Enforcement Candidates in Brazil”, IAST Lunch Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, October 9, 2018, 12:45–13:45, room MS003.