Abstract

A ruler who does not identify with a social group, whether on religious, ethnic, cultural or socioeconomic grounds, is confronted with a trade-off between taking advantage of the outgroup population's eagerness to maintain its identity and inducing it to "comply" (conversion, quit, exodus or any other way of accommodating the ruler's own identity). This paper first analyzes the ruler's optimal mix of discriminatory and non-discriminatory taxation, both in a static and an evolving environment. It thereby derives a set of unconventional predictions. The paper then tests the theory in the context of Egypt's conversion to Islam after 641 using novel data sources. The evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Reference

Mohamed Saleh, “Taxing Identity: Fiscal Policy and Conversions in Early Islam”, IAST Lunch Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, October 2, 2018, 12:45–13:45, room MS003.