Abstract

This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Replaces

Ingela Alger, and Jean-François Laslier, “Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation”, IAST Working Paper, n. 20-118, November 2020, revised October 2021.

Ingela Alger, and Jean-François Laslier, “Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation”, IAST Working Paper, n. 20-118, November 2020, revised October 2021.