Abstract

This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Keywords

Replaced by

Ingela Alger, and Jean-François Laslier, “Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 34, n. 2, March 2022.

Ingela Alger, and Jean-François Laslier, “Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 34, n. 2, March 2022.