Article

The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton et Dominique Lepelley

Résumé

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.

Mots-clés

Condorcet; Separable preferences; Logrolling; Vote Trading;

Codes JEL

  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Remplace

Publié dans

Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, p. 315–321