Résumé

A longstanding question is whether policy uncertainty reduces private fixed investment in developing democracies. Yet studying the question empirically has proven challenging given that economic activity can cause as well as result from policy uncertainty. We investigate this issue within the context of electoral business cycles, building on research that suggests elections provide an exogenous source of policy uncertainty. As a central part of this analysis, which involves four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, we examine how institutional constraints moderate the relationship. Three main findings emerge. First, on average, elections are associated with a decline in private fixed investment. Second, however, this effect varies according to the level of institutional constraints; as they increase, the electoral cycle becomes less pronounced, including in specifications that account for the potential endogeneity of the institutions. Third, the effects are larger and more robust in systems with fixed elections.

Remplacé par

Brandice Canes-Wrone, Christian Ponce de Leon et Sebastian Thieme, « Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections », Presidential Studies Quarterly, mars 2023.